Against these things, Titurius [Sabinus] was exclaiming that they would act too late, after larger bands of the enemies had gathered with the Germans having been added or after something of a disaster had been sustained in the nearest winter camps; that the opportunity of deliberating/consulting was short; that Caesar was thought to have set out to Italy; neither would the Carnutes have adapted the plan of the killing Tasgetius nor, if that man [Caesar] had been present, would the Eburones be approaching the camps of our men with so great a disdain of us.

[He/Sabinus was exclaiming] that he did not regard the enemy but the affair as the advisor/authority: [namely] that the Rhine [River] was close; that the death of Ariovistus and our previous victories were for [the purpose of] great grief for the Germans; that Gaul burned, with so many insults received, having been reduced under the power of the Roman people,[and] with the previous glory of a military matter destroyed.

Lastly, [he was exclaiming] who would convince him by this, without certain proof that Ambiorix had proceeded to a plan of such a sort? [He was shouting] That his own opinion was safe in either side; if there were nothing harder, [then] they would arrive with no danger to the nearby legion; if all Gaul would agree/conspire with the Germans, [then] safety depends on speed alone.

[He shouted] what result does the proposal of Cotta and of those who disagreed have? In which case, if not present danger, then certainly was not famine from a long seige to be feared?.