Last several pages contain essay questions from the workbook so you may ignore them…
Tag Archives: DBG Bk 5
DBG 5.46-5.48
5.46
Caesar, with the letters received around the eleventh hour of the day, immediately sends a messenger to the [territory of] the Bellovaci to the quaestor Marcus Crassus, whose winter quarters were twenty five miles away from him; he [Caesar] orders a legion to set out in the middle of the night and to come to him [Caesar] quickly. Crassus leaves with the messenger [i.e., as soon as he got the message]. He sends the other envoy to Gaius Fabius, so that he may induce the legion into the boundaries of the Atrebates where he was knowing a journey must be made by him.
He writes to Labienus [that], if he was able to act for the interest of the republic, he should come with a legion to the territory of the Nervi. He does not think that the remaining part of the army, which was slightly farther away, should be waited for; he gathers together about 400 cavalry from the nearest winter quarters.
5.47
Around the third hour, informed by scouts about the arrival of Crassus, on that day he [Caesar] proceeds twenty miles. He puts Crassus in charge at Samaraobriva and gives/assigns [him] a legion, because there he was leaving behind the army’s equipment/baggage, the hostages of the [Gallic] states, public letters, and all the grain which in this [place] he had conveyed for the purpose of enduring the winter. Fabius, as it had been commanded, not having delayed much [for this reason] meets [him, Caesar] on the march with the legion.
Having learned the death of Sabinus and murder of cohorts, since all the forces of the Treveri had come to him, Labienus having feared that, if he had made a similar departure of flight from the winter quarters, he would not be able to sustain the force of the enemy, especially [those enemies] whom he knew to be elated by a fresh victory, he sends letters back to Caesar, with how much danger (to him) he was about to lead out (his) legion from winter quarters; he describes what happened to the Eburones; he explains (that) all of the cavalries and infantries of the Treveri had taken a position a distance (of) 3 miles from his own camp.
5.48
With his [Labienus’s] plan having been approved, although disappointed with [his] opinions of the three legions, Caesar had gone back to two [legions]; nevertheless he was depending on the only [hope for] rescue of the common safety in speed. He comes into the territory of Nervii by large [i.e., forced] marches. There from the captives, he learns what [things] are being done at Cicero[‘s location], and in how much danger the thing [i.e., affair] is. Then he persuades somebody from horsemen of Gaul with a great reward, that he might bring a letter to Cicero.
He sends this written in Greek letters, lest our plans are recognized by the enemies, with the letter having been intercepted. If he [the messenger] should not able to attack, he advises that he [the messenger] should hurl within the entrenchments of the camps a javelin with the letter tied down to a strap. He writes in the letter that he will be there swiftly having set out with the legions; he urges that he [Cicero] maintain [his] previous courage. The Gaul [i.e., the messenger] having feared danger, as it had been commanded, throws [his] spear.
This [spear]by change stuck to the tower; and not noticed by our men for two days, was discerned by some soldier on the third day, taken down it is brought to Cicero. That man [Cicero] reads out loud the read-through [letter] (he read the letter to himself, and then after that, out loud) and inspires them all with the greatest joy. Then the smokes of the fires were being seen in the distance, which matter drove out all uncertainty in regard to the arrival of the legion .
DBG 5.41-5.45
5.41
(First half… up to sese)
At that time, the leaders and chiefs of the Nervii who have some access of conversation and a cause of friendship with Cicero say [that] they wish to converse. With the possibility having been made, they state the same [things] which Ambiorix had discussed with Titurius: [that] all Gaul was in arms, [that] the Germans crossed the the Rhine, [that] the camps of Caesar’s other men wer attacked. They add also about the death of Sabinus. They show Ambiorix for the sake of creating credibility.
They say that these men [Romans] are mistaken if they hope anything of help from them [the Romans], who despair from their affairs; that they, however, are with this mind towards Cicero and the Roman people, [such] that they reject nothing except the winter camps and do not wish that this custom become ingrained: that it is permitted to them [the Romans] to depart unhurt from the winter quarters through themselves and to set out into whatever region they wish without fear.
To these Cicero replies just once: [that] it is not a habit of the Roman people to accept from the armed enemy any condition: if they wish to withdraw from weapons, they may use him as a helper and they may send legates to Caesar; that he hopes that in accordance with his [Caesar’s] justice that they would obtain those things which they sought.
5.42
Having been repelled/disappointed from this hope, the Nervii encompass the winter-camp with a wall of 9 feet (high) and with a trench of 15 feet (deep). They had learned these things from us by the custom of previous years, and were instructed by those whom they were taking secretly as captives from the army; but with no supply of an iron tool which was fit for this need/use, they were compelled to cut around the sod with a sword, [and] to empty the land with hands and with a small coat.
From which matter indeed the multitude of men was able to be known: for in less than 3 hours they completed the fortification 15 miles in circumference; and in the remaining days they began to prepare and make towers to the height of the wall, hooks and tortoises, which the same captives had taught.
5.43
On the seventh day of the assault, with a very great wind having risen, they began to hurl hot balls of molten clay from slings and heated javelins upon the huts, which in accordance to Gallic custom had been covered with straw. These quickly seize fire and by the violence of the wind they spread it into every part of the camp.
DBG 5.37
5.37
DBG 5.36
5. 36
Disturbed by these things Quintus Titurius [Sabinus], when he had caught sight of Ambiorix from afar encouraging his men, sends his interpreter Gnaius Pompeius to him (Ambiorix) in order to request that he spare him and his soldiers. He having been called replied: if he should wish to speak with him, (it) is permitted; that (he) hopes (this thing) which pertains to the safety for the soldiers can be gained from the people; that to him truly no harm would be done, and that he pledged his faith to that matter.
That man [Sabinus] communicates with wounded Cotta, if it seemed appropriate that they retire from the fight and speak together with Ambiorix: [saying that he] hope to be able to have gained from Ambiorix concerning his own safety and of the soldiers. Cotta refuses to go to an armed enemy and in this (refusal) he perseveres/remains stubborn.
DBG 5.35
5.35
Nevertheless, although distressed with so many disadvantages, with many wounds received,they were withstanding and with a great part of the day spent, although it was fought from dawn to the eighth hour, they were doing nothing which was unworthy of them.
Then each thigh for Titus Balventius, who had led as first centurion the previous year, a brave man and of great authority, is pierced by a javelin; Quintus Lucanius of the same rank fighting very bravely is slain while he comes to aid [his] surrounded son; Lucus Cotta the ambassador is wounded while encouraging all the cohorts and ranks directly in the face with a slingshot.
DBG 5.34
5.34
DBG 5.32 and 5.33
5.32
But the enemies, after they had become aware of their departure from the nocturnal noise and wakefulness, with ambushes having been placed in two parts in the woods in a fit and hidden place about two miles away they awaited the arrival of the Romans, and when the larger part of the army had sent itself into a great valley, suddenly they presented themselves from each of two parts of that valley and they began to harass the last men [i.e., the men in the rear] and to prevent the first from ascending and to engage in battle in a place most unfavorable for our men.
5.33
Then finally Titurius, who had foreseen foresaw nothing before[hand], [began to] shake with fear and to ran about and to station the cohorts. [He did] these very things nevertheless cowardly/fearly and as if all things seemed to fail him; [that] which was accustomed to happen very often to those who are compelled to take advice in the very business. But Cotta, since he had thought that these things were able to happen in the journey and because he had not been the adviser to this cause of setting out, he failed in no affair for the purpose of the common security and he surpassed his duties both of general in calling and encouraging the soldiers and of a soldier in battle. Since they were less easily able to perform everything through themselves, and to foresee/provide what was to be done in each place because of the length of the army line, they ordered to announce that they should leave the baggage and settle into a circle.
Which/this plan, although in such a disaster must not be condemned, nevertheless turned out inconveniently: for [this plan] both diminished the hope of our soldiers and made the enemy more eager for fighting, because it seemed that this was not done without the highest fear and desperation. Besides that happened, which was necessary to happen, that the soldiers commonly were departing from the standards, what each [man] was holding most dear he was hastening to seek and to grab from the baggage, [and] everything was filled with clamor and weeping.
DBG 5.30 and 5.31
5.30
This discussion having been considered into either region/side, when it was being resisted fiercely by Cotta and the first ranks, “Prevail/Win,” Sabinus said, “if you wish thus,” and this with a rather clear voice, so that a great part of the soldiers might hear “nor am I someone,” he says, “**who from among you is very seriously terrified by the danger of death: these (soldiers) will understand/know; if something more serious will have occured, they will demand an account from you, [these men] who, if it might be allowed through you, having been joined together on the day after tomorrow with the next winter camps, would endure the common fortune of war with the rest, [and] not cast out and removed far from the test, would perish either by the sword or by hunger”
** relative clause of characteristic
5.31
There is a rising up from the meeting/council; they grab each and beg, that they not bring the situation into the highest danger by their disagreement or stubbornness: that the matter was easy, whether they remain or they proceed, if only they all notice and approve the same thing; on the other hand they saw no safety in dissension/disagreement. The matter is prolonged by discussion to midnight.
Finally Cotta, upset, gives hands (surrenders); the opinion of Sabinus remains. It is announced that they will go at dawn. The remaining part of the night is spent watching [i.e., without sleep], since each soldier examined his things, what he might be able to carry with himself, [and] what of the equipment of the winter quarters he might be forced to leave behind.
All things are devised, why they would stay without danger and [by what means] the danger is increased by the weakness of the soldiers and by [their] watching [i.e., sleeplessness]. They set out at dawn from the camp in such a way as to whom it had been persuaded not by the enemy but by advice given by the very friendly man Ambiorix, in a very long column and with very great baggage.
DBG 5.29
Against these things, Titurius [Sabinus] was exclaiming that they would act too late, after larger bands of the enemies had gathered with the Germans having been added or after something of a disaster had been sustained in the nearest winter camps; that the opportunity of deliberating/consulting was short; that Caesar was thought to have set out to Italy; neither would the Carnutes have adapted the plan of the killing Tasgetius nor, if that man [Caesar] had been present, would the Eburones be approaching the camps of our men with so great a disdain of us.
[He/Sabinus was exclaiming] that he did not regard the enemy but the affair as the advisor/authority: [namely] that the Rhine [River] was close; that the death of Ariovistus and our previous victories were for [the purpose of] great grief for the Germans; that Gaul burned, with so many insults received, having been reduced under the power of the Roman people,[and] with the previous glory of a military matter destroyed.
Lastly, [he was exclaiming] who would convince him by this, without certain proof that Ambiorix had proceeded to a plan of such a sort? [He was shouting] That his own opinion was safe in either side; if there were nothing harder, [then] they would arrive with no danger to the nearby legion; if all Gaul would agree/conspire with the Germans, [then] safety depends on speed alone.
[He shouted] what result does the proposal of Cotta and of those who disagreed have? In which case, if not present danger, then certainly was not famine from a long seige to be feared?.